A method is presented for measuring the marginal welfare cost of environmental regulations affecting agriculture. The method incorporates output market effects and recognizes diversity in production conditions among crops, regions, and seasons. An important advantage of the method is that only regional outputs and changes in regional production costs are needed to calculate deadweight loss, thus simplifying the measurement of welfare changes. This feature of the model is significant since the complexity and substantial data requirements of most existing impact models cause many environmental regulations to be enacted with inadequate analysis of their economic impacts. The method also disaggregates welfare impacts by crop, place, and time, thus encouraging the implementation of nonuniform interventions that achieve a given level of environmental quality more efficiently than uniform policies.
Zilberman analysis of re-entry intervals following pesticide applications that calculates firstbest, region-and crop-specific regulations. The Lichtenberg, Zilberman, and Bogen study of drinking water contamination also suggests that different water quality standards should be developed for urban and rural areas as a result of the significant economies of scale in urban water treatment.
A method is presented for measuring the marginal costs of nonuniform environmental regulations that recognizes differences in production conditions among crops, regions, and seasons. There have been several attempts to develop methods for measuring marginal costs of environmental regulations affecting agriculture, most notably Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman. This paper extends the existing literature by explicitly considering temporal as well as spatial diversity, thus facilitating the design of environmental regulations that are season-and region-specific. This modification is especially important in markets for perishable commodities that have widely fluctuating prices, quantities, and market shares over time.
The formal analysis in the next section results in an equation characterizing marginal welfare impacts for each crop and season combination as a weighted average of the changes in regional marginal production costs. This theoretical result is appealing on practical grounds because the method requires only readily obtainable information to assess the marginal costs of environmental regulations. Further, the welfare impacts can be calculated with a spreadsheet, thus making the method low-cost and accessible to noneconomist policy makers. Econometric measures of demand and supply elasticities, which are difficult to estimate and interpret, are only needed to partition the total welfare losses into consumer and producer surplus changes; the aggregate welfare loss does not depend on these elasticities. The welfare loss expression developed in the next section also is shown to be a close approximation to true welfare loss in an important class of production models.
The practical value of the model developed in this paper depends on the ability of regulatory agencies to enforce crop, region, and time-specific environmental regulations. Nonuniform regulations are feasible, as the following paragraphs demonstrate. Nationally, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, growers of a particular crop in a particular region can request a Section 18 exemption from registration requirements in case of extreme need, usually defined as large profit losses resulting from the absence of alternative controls. Chemical bans and the taking of arable land for critical habitat protection for endangered species are also done on a regional basis.
Physical information is being used to develop localized environmental policies affecting agriculture. For example, the state of California is currently banning the use of pesticides likely to leach into groundwater in certain Pesticide Management Zones (PMZ). Growers operating within these areas are denied access to these chemicals through the registration process, wherein growers must file for permission to use certain agricultural chemicals at the time of purchase. The state has developed a Geographic Information System (GIS) that enables the permit issuer to tell whether the grower's field is within a PMZ and act accordingly. A similar program is being developed for the Corn Belt by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to control nutrient contamination of groundwater.
Finally, there are a small number of current environmental regulations that are seasonal. For example, some re-entry and preharvest intervals after pesticide applications vary by season as foliar residue decay rates depend on temperature, humidity, and rainfall. Making more environmental regulations season dependent can have significant welfare benefits. In fact, in the empirical example of a pesticide cancellation presented below, seasonal differences in the marginal welfare impacts of cancellation within a region are as large as the variation between regions in a given season.
The formal analysis, presented in the next section, culminates in an expression for the marginal welfare costs of environmental regulation. The method is then used to calculate the marginal costs of banning the pesticide, mevinphos. State and federal agencies are investigating whether this organophosphate insecticide poses unreasonable risks to farm workers and consumers, particularly infants (State of California), and the state of California has recently taken steps to ban its use in the state entirely. Measures of the marginal welfare costs of banning mevinphos in California, based on information from four vegetable crops grown in various parts of the state and elsewhere, are presented.
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Marginal Welfare Costs of Environmental Regulation
Economic welfare is defined here as the unweighted sum of producer and consumer surplus; the impacts described here are gross welfare changes from regulation since the analysis does not quantify the benefits of regulation such as increased levels of human and environmental health. Denote the level of production of some crop in region i in period t by qit and the market price in period t by the inverse demand function p,(q,), where q, is total production of I regions at time t. where Eit is the elasticity of supply in region i in time t, and rt, is the elasticity of demand in time t. The system of I + 1 equations can be solved to obtain marginal changes in regional production and market price, dq,, and dp,. Note that equations (4) and (5) In regions that are not directly affected by environmental regulation, this expression reduces to q,dp,. These growers should gain from the Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
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(2) aqi , a,qit regulation to the extent that it raises marginal costs in competing regions and increases output price as a result. Expression (8) can also be interpreted in terms of changes in quasi-rent: the first term is simply the change in farm revenue resulting from the regulation, while the second term is the change in production costs. The gross marginal welfare cost of a change in environmental regulations is calculated by summing the expressions for the change in consumer and regional producer surplus to obtain (9) dW, = _jI aMCit (qit, tit )dqit q (9)
The marginal change in social welfare in each time period is thus equal to a weighted average of changes in regional marginal costs of production, with weights given by preregulation output levels. Expression (9) is highly intuitive: the marginal cost of environmental regulation is equal to the increase in the value of inputs to agricultural production. This expression also shows that marginal welfare loss is separable in the change in regional marginal production costs and separable over time, a feature that greatly simplifies the computation of impacts. Expression (9) is significant for policy analysis since it implies that decision makers can assess the total marginal welfare costs (i.e., the marginal effects on consumer and producer surplus) of environmental regulation with information that is simple to obtain. Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman show that when marginal production costs for each region are equal to average costs, as in case of the step-function supply curve, the change in regional marginal cost at time t is equal to
where Vrit is the percent change in regional yield, Yit is regional yield, and dCit is the change in per acre production costs, all at time t. While there may be a large number of regions and time periods considered [in fact this is preferred as it increases the accuracy of equation (9), as discussed later], each individual datum in equation (10) This lack of analysis is due in part to the complexity of many existing agricultural impact models, and to the fact that the basic data used in these models, especially supply and demand elasticities, are difficult to obtain. Equation (9) is a first-order approximation to the change in deadweight loss and thus is accurate only for small changes in marginal production costs. For large changes, it may be necessary to solve a system of supply and demand equations directly and compute new equilibrium prices following imposition of the environmental regulation. While more elaborate methods are required to assess the impacts of quantum changes in environmental regulations, such as massive pesticide cancellations (e.g., Chambers and Lichtenberg), such regulations are the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, environmental regulations affecting agriculture are increasingly promulgated at the state or local level.
There is an interesting connection between the impact framework in equation (9) and the "microparameter" or "putty-clay" class of production models of Hochman and Zilberman; Berck and Helfand; Paris; and Moffit, Zilberman, and Just. These authors have shown that local von Leibig production functions are consistent with Cobb-Douglas or other continuous aggregate production functions if there is continuous variation among individual atomistic production units. In the microparameter framework with a finite number of individual production units, each with positive measure, aggregate marginal cost is a step function, with the flat portion of each step given by constant marginal cost in a particular production region. Each region also faces output capacity constraints due to a limited natural resource base or the type of production technology employed. In the finite microparameter case, the marginal change in welfare resulting from environmental regulation is approximated by equation (9) since variation in production conditions is completely captured by inter-regional differences in marginal cost (provided, of course, that the underlying yield and cost change estimates are accurately measured). (9), which is the sum of the changes in regional marginal production costs. Note that this analysis can incorporate any type of supply shift (i.e., parallel, proportional, or more complicated types) as determined by the regional data.
There is some ex ante uncertainty about the yield impacts of adopting alternative production technologies. Zilberman et al. suggest that this uncertainty should be explicitly incorporated into impact analyses of environmental regulations. Formally, they suggest treating the percentage yield change in a particular region and season, jit, as drawn from some density. Given this density, it is straightforward to calculate the mean impacts of the regulation, E(dW,), as well as the associated distribution of marginal impacts. It is convenient to describe the distribution of impacts in terms of confidence levels, where a denotes the probability that the impacts exceed some level. Formally, define dWta as the solution to prob(dWt > dW,a) = a. In the empirical example below, dWt is calculated for several different confidence levels.
There are several possible sources for the density of yield impacts of the regulation in a particular crop, region, and season. The error on statistical assessments of field trials is one possible source, but this error may not represent actual farm conditions. Instead, it is preferable to conduct interviews with industry experts, including growers, pesticide dealers, university researchers, extension agents, and chemical company representatives. The survey responses are then used to calculate the distribution of impacts by a Monte Carlo method. Yield change estimates for each crop, region, and season are selected randomly from the set of survey responses, and marginal welfare impacts are then calculated according to equation (9). This procedure is repeated many times to create a set of marginal welfare impacts. Finally, the set of impact estimates is used to obtain dW,a for various confidence levels.
Application to Mevinphos Regulation
In this section the method developed above is applied to a specific problem: measuring the marginal welfare costs of banning the mevinphos pesticide for vegetable production in California. Mevinphos (2-carbomethyoxy-l-methylvinyl dimethyl phosphate) is an insecticide-acaricide with contact and systemic activity that is most commonly used by California growers to control aphids on broccoli, cauliflower, head lettuce, and leaf lettuce. Mevinphos is used to eradicate aphids just prior to harvest so that growers can meet the stringent U.S. Department of Agriculture quality standards.
The The basis of the marginal welfare analysis, equation (9), indicates that it is necessary to compute the effects of the cancellation on marginal production costs separately for each crop, region, and season. Equation (10) relates changes in marginal cost to changes in per acre production costs and yields when growers adopt the next-highest profit alternative to mevinphos. Several alternative controls were considered: dimethoate, diazinon, thiodan, imidacloprid (available only to Imperial Valley growers under a Section 18 exemption), and pyrellin.
Telephone interviews were conducted with fifty-six growers, pesticide dealers and applicators, extension advisers, commodity group representatives, produce packers and distributors, and university researchers to assess the yield effects from switching to each of the alternative aphid controls. Interview subjects were asked to give the countywide yield change resulting from replacing mevinphos with alternative aphid controls and specifically were asked to assess actual changes rather than report the results of experiments on highly managed plots. It is important to remember that the alternative chemical controls listed above have existed for many years, and survey respondents were generally familiar with the actual field performance of the alternatives. These survey responses are the basis for the Monte Carlo analysis of welfare impacts described in the previous section. Changes in per acre production costs are determined by calculating per acre chemical expenditures for each of the alternatives (at standard application rates and market prices) and subtracting this number from the per acre cost of mevinphos application. Generally, changes in per acre cost are empirically insignificant for the set of crops considered here, since chemical cost is only a small fraction of the crop budget. Table 1 shows the highest-profit alternatives to mevinphos for each of the crop, region, and season combinations, and also reports the associated yield and per acre cost changes. The highest-profit alternatives to mevinphos are imidacloprid (all crops in Imperial), diazinon (broccoli, cauliflower, and leaf lettuce in the remaining regions) and dimethoate (head lettuce in regions other than Imperial). Expected yield losses obtained from the industry survey vary by season and by region; generally, expected yield losses are higher in the Monterey and South Coast areas and higher in the summer months due to weather conditions favoring aphid growth. Table 1 also gives sample standard deviations for the assessed yield changes. Table 2 presents the marginal welfare costs of banning mevinphos use in California, calculated using equations (9) and (10) and the data in table 1. The expected marginal welfare costs of banning mevinphos are $53.3 million annually, as compared to total annual revenues of $924 million for these four crops. Mean monthly deadweight losses, where the expectation is taken over the sample distribution, vary widely over the year according to market share among growing regions and yield and cost changes, thus underscoring the importance of disaggregating impacts over time as well as region.
The marginal welfare costs of a mevinphos ban are highest for head lettuce since this is the largest market considered and a significant share of the nation's output comes from California. Mean losses are largest during MayJune and November-December, during which time most head lettuce is produced in California's Monterey and San Joaquin Valley regions. It is also interesting to note that mean losses are virtually zero during December-February, during which time nearly all output is produced in the Imperial Valley and other domestic regions that do not rely on mevinphos.
Since disaggregating environmental regulaSunding tions along the lines suggested in this paper has some cost implications for the administrative agency designing and enforcing the rule, it is important to assess the social welfare value of a disaggregated as opposed to a uniform regulation. The Lorenz Curve, which is often used to represent inequality in the distribution of income, is a useful way of summarizing the benefit from implementing nonuniform regulations. ~.
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Implications for Policy Design
Standard arguments in the economic theory of environmental policy suggest that regulations be set at their first-or second-best levels. In the notation of this paper, the first-best regulation satisfies max{B(git) -C(Qit)} Vi, t, where B((i,t) is the benefit from the regulation derived from higher environmental quality or public health, and C(it,) is the cost of the regulation in terms of lost producer and consumer surplus. Alternatively, the regulation may be set to min{C(Qi,)} s.t. B(iit) > , Vi, t, where P is some predetermined level of benefit. It is also possible to find efficient regulations incorporating the uncertainty inherent in the impact analysis by using dW,, in conjunction with "safety-fixed" rules (Kataoka) for environmental quality in the manner suggested by Lichtenberg and Zilberman. The large degree of variation in the confidence interval estimates in table 3 implies that there is value in obtaining better scientific information about the yield impacts of environmental regulations. A risk-averse regulator will change regulations significantly in response to uncertainty about marginal welfare impacts, and, thus, reducing ex ante uncertainty about yield changes will result in regulations that more accurately balance marginal costs and benefits. Regardless of whether environmental regulations affecting agriculture are set at their firstor second-best levels, it is necessary for policy makers to assess the marginal cost of the intervention. The method developed in this paper is a simple algorithm for performing such an analysis. Expression (9) is an improvement over previous impact assessment methods in that it gives a theoretically appealing and easily computable formula for measuring region-and time-specific welfare loss.' The method developed here is valid for marginal changes in environmental regulations, including regulations promulgated at the state or local level. Global methods are needed to evaluate quantum changes in regulations.
Finally, the framework developed here can be used to integrate economic information with existing earth science data in a single regulatory approach. Geographic Information Systems are rapidly gaining acceptance among environmental professionals. These data bases contain highly detailed information on spatial characteristics, such as land use patterns, and environmental conditions, such as groundwater depth and quality, soil characteristics, and microclimate. These data bases may also contain dynamic information for particular locations, such as lateral groundwater flow. GIS data is increasingly used to identify environmentally sensitive areas, for example, agricultural areas where pesticides have a high probability of infilIt is interesting to compare the regional distribution of marginal costs and benefits. Since most citizens live in urban areas, the benefits from improving environmental quality will often be concentrated in these regions, particularly if environmental regulation results in increases in wildlife populations. The benefits from environmental regulations of agriculture can be local as well. For example, regulations to ensure farm worker safety and improve drinking water quality primarily will benefit rural residents. Producer surplus losses that are the bulk of the welfare costs of environmental regulations primarily are felt in rural areas.
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trating groundwater, or regions with high densities of an endangered species. The model developed in this paper can be used to measure the marginal costs of regulating agricultural production at a disaggregated level, and it thus can be paired with detailed GIS data to give regulators a full picture of the marginal costs and benefits of localized environmental regulation.
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